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What is the relationship between the performance of business firms and the
growth of the national economy? Economists who study economic growth
commonly treat nations themselves as the performing units that save, invest,
and experience technological change. But business historians following the
lead ofAlfred Chandler often imply that the record ofthe national economy is
not much more than the aggregation ofthe successes and failures ofits major
corporations. To quote Chandler (1994, 57): "First, and most important, the
United States is not going the way of the United Kingdom in terms of long-
term competitive strength. . . . Today American companies remain powerful
competitors in the most dynamic and transforming industries ofthe late twenti-
eth century."
To resolve this dichotomy, we have to ask who does the learning that consti-
tutes technological progress for the economy, and how that knowledge is accu-
mulated and implemented over time. With specific reference to the American
surge into world economic leadership in the decades bracketing the tum ofthe
twentieth century, this paper advances two propositions: First, that technologi-
cal progress was a network phenomenon, growing out of the actions of large
numbers ofinteracting people-not necessarily in formally structured institu-
tions of coordination. Second, that these networks were strongly national in
character. An implication is thatAmerican industrial firms were able to institu-
tionalize research and development systems after 1900, in large part because
Gavin Wright is the Willianl Robertson Coe Professor ofAmerican Economic History at Stan-
ford University.
The author would like to thank the organizers (Naomi Lamoreaux, Daniel M. G. Raff, and Peter
Temin) for inviting and encouraging this paper. Critical readings by Alexander Field and the other
conference participants are greatly appreciated. Useful suggestions were- also received from Nate
Rosenberg and the members of the Economic Growth Program of the Canadian Institute for Ad-
vanced Research, and from the anonymous reader for the University ofChicago Press.
295296 Gavin Wright
they could draw upon, extend, and channel the energies ofpreviously existing
technological networks. In a real sense the learning was national.
The term "network" has many valid meanings in economics. It may refer to
a physically connected infrastructural system, such as railroads or pipelines,
or by extension to an established pattern ofinterfirm supply relationships. As
used by sociologists, "networks" are extrafirm linkages among business lead-
ers, based on common social backgrounds and political interests over extended
periods (Granovetter 1995). The usage here is broaderand perhaps less precise,
a technological learning network composed ofpeople who are not necessarily
acquainted with each other personally, but who share a common technical lan-
guage and problem-solving environment-an "invisible college" in the lan-
guage ofthe history ofscience (Price 1963, 85). The premise is that technology
is not simply abody.ofabstract information, butis inherently social, embedded
in terminology, in procedures, in physical equipment, and in products.
The point ofthis conceptualization is to try to draw insights from the anal-
ogy to interdependent physical systems, in which technological choices are
affected by "network externalities." Most technological progress entails net-
work externalities in that it builds upon an installed base ofexisting technology
and improves some aspect ofthat base incrementally. Processes ofthis sort are
subject to increasing returns to scale, multiple equilibria, and path dependence,
in that historical events may have lasting effects on future developments. I
Technological spillovers at the local or regional level have been conceptually
familiar since Marshall (1920), and confirmed empirically with modem data
(Jaffe, Trajtenberg, and Henderson 1993). This paper goes further, and argues
that major historical spillovers were national. Although it would hardly be ap-
propriate to say that the American economy became "locked in" at an early
point to particular techniques of production, the paper contends that certain
features ofthe process oftechnological change were distinctively national, and
persisted across the vast organizational and scientific space dividing the nine-
teenth and twentieth centuries.
The paper begins by establishing that American economic growth in the
nineteenth century did entail learning, and that this learning was substantially a
national network phenomenon. The first ofthese assertions may seem trivially
obvious, but it requires special attention here because ofthe practice now en-
trenched among economists ofequating "learning" with changes in "total fac-
tor productivity," also known as the "residual." As will be argued, collective
national learning may reside just as much in the discovery, expansion, and ac-
cumulation ofthe factors ofproduction as in their productivity. Following the
lead of Abramovitz and David (1973, 432), "Our.point is that there may be
more to technological change than the residual can capture, rather than less"
(italics added).
1. The recent economic history literature on these topics begins with David (1985) and Arthur
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Pursuing this theme, subsequent sections focus, not on the rationality of
technological choices (a preoccupation of much of the New Economic His-
tory), but on its network character. The venerable example ofring versus mule
spinning in cotton textile technology is used as an example. The argument is
then applied to minerals, building on evidence that the United States was far
ahead ofthe rest ofthe wOFld in resource development, and that these sectors
drew increasingly upon advanced forms ofknowledge and expertise. The fol-
lowing section identifies elements of continuity between these nineteenth-
century patterns and the organized science-based industrial research techno-
logies that arose after 1900. A salient feature ofboth regimes was the persis-
tence ofcollective learning beyond the boundaries ofsponsoring firms. A con-
cluding section speculates on the implications ofmodem research institutions
for national learning networks.
8.1 Dimensions ofAmerican Economic Performance
On one reading ofAmerican economic history, there is nothing to be ex-
plained. According to Angus Maddison's figures, the United States overtook
the United Kingdom in gross domestic product per capita or per work hour
around 1890, and moved into a position ofworld leadership for the subsequent
century. But perhaps these events were only a reflection of favorable natural
conditions and the rapid growth offactors ofproduction, as opposed to techno-
logical progress. The historian Paul Kennedy (1987, 242-43) has written:
With the Civil War over, the United States was able to exploit [its] many
advantages-rich agricultural land, vast raw materials, and the marvelously
convenient evolution of modem technology (railways, the steam engine,
mining equipment) to develop such resources; the lack of social and geo-
graphic constraints; the absence of significant foreign dangers; the flow of
foreign and, increasingly, domestic capital-totransform itselfat a stunning
pace....Indeed, given the advantages listed above, there was a virtual inevi-
tability to the whole process. That is to say, only persistent human inepti-
tude, or near-constant civil war, or a climatic disaster could have checked
this expansion-or deterred the millions of immigrants who flowed across
the Atlantic to get their share ofthe pot ofgold and to swell the productive
labor force.
Economists might find confirmation of this account in standard macroeco-
nomic data, at least if they have become habituated to dividing growth into
parts attributable to "expansion ofinputs" on the one hand, and "technological
progress" on the other. Not only did the United States enjoy a rapid increase
in the size ofits territory and population, but between 1890 and 1910 its rate
ofgross nonresidential capital formation was the highest in the world, culmi-
nating a century-long increase (Maddison 1991, 41). In this view, only in the
twentieth century did the country experience knowledge-based economic
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Fig.8.1 Cumulative laboratory foundations in U.S. manufacturing
Source: Mowery and Rosenberg (1989, table 4.1).
business enterprises (fig. 8.1). By international standards, however, American
leadership in science was long delayed. As late as 1940, the United States
ranked a poor fourth to the United Kingdom, Germany, and France as a cumu-
lative winner ofNobel Prizes in physics and chemistry (fig. 8.2).
To press this view further, Steven Broadberry's new estimates ofproductiv-
ity in manufacturing show that the United States maintained roughly a 2:1lead
over Britain and Germany in this sector as early as 1869, perhaps as far back
as 1840 or even earlier (Broadberry 1993, 1994a, 1994b). The rise of the
United States in world rankings could not therefore have come from an acceler-
ation of relative productivity growth in manufacturing, despite the emphasis
on that sector in much ofthe literature. Broadberry concludes that U.S. leader-
ship must have originated elsewhere in the economy, and that high relative
labor productivity in manufacturing was simply a feature ofthe environment.
The difference between the United States and other leading countries, he sug-
gests, "must surely be due to natural resources" (1994a, 536). Indeed, the
United States was the world's largest producer ofnearly everyone ofthe major
industrial minerals of that era, and Wright (1990) shows that the coefficient
ofrelative resource intensity in American manufacturing exports was actually
increasing across the period ofascendancy to economic leadership, from 1879
to 1928.
To accept these facts as indications that nineteenth-century American
growth involved "no technological progress" or "no learning" would be unwar-
ranted, a triumph of conventional methodology .pver history and common
sense. The rapid expansion ofthe factors ofproduction was not exogenous to
the flow of American history, no more so than the "marvelously convenient
evolution of technology." After showing that crude total factor productivity







1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990
Fig. 8.2 Cumulative Nobel Prizes in physics and chemistry, 1901-94
Source: Nobel Foundation Directory (1995-96).
century, Abramovitz and David (1973) go on to argue that the stimulus to new
investments was continually renewed by biased, capital-using, and scale-
dependent technological change. Similarly, Olmstead and Rhode (1993) em-
phasize that the territorial expansion ofAmerican agriculture was not simply a
replication ofexisting techniques on additional acreage, butwas a vast learning
experience in biological adaptation. And as will be argued below, world leader-
ship in mineral production was not primarily the result ofa fortunate geologi-
cal endowment, but represented a return to advances in exploration, training,
and the technologies ofextraction, refining, and utilization. Only in retrospect
was the national ascendancy a "virtual inevitability": clearly many people were
gaining new and useful knowledge in nineteenth-century America.
In a sense this view is implicit in the literature on the ''American system of
manufactures," arising from the interpretive treatments of Habakkuk (1962)
and Temin (1966). British engineers visiting the United States in the 1850s
were struckby certain novelAmerican technologies in small-arms manufacture
and other industries, and economic historians have subsequently struggled to
translate these observations into recognizable economic categories. Without
attempting to summarize this entire discussion, we may say that one of its
results has been a list of identifiable traits that differentiated American from
British manufacturing practice. Some examples include
1. Greater use ofnatural resources relative to both capital and labor (David
1974). Particularly in the early years, American machines and products tended
to be made ofwood, which was relatively cheap, and the United States became
a leader in woodworking (Rosenberg [1981] 1995).
2. The use ofspecial-purpose machinery, allowing long production runs of300 Gavin Wright
standardized commodities (Ames and Rosenberg 1968; Hounshell 1984, chap.
1). These products were adapted to American tastes and to the relatively equal
distribution ofincome.
3. American manufacturing firms operatedjasterthan theirEuropean coun-
terparts, from machine speeds to the intensity of the work pace (Field 1983;
Clark 1987). The intense use ofthe capital stock was a forerunner ofthe "high-
throughput" systems perfected by large corporate enterprises around the turn
ofthe twentieth century (Chandler 1977).
4. American technology did not necessarily substitute capital for "labor"
generally, but deployed machinery to substitute unskilled labor for skilled craft
labor (Harley 1974). Early American factories relied heavily on women and
child labor, and subsequently on immigrants (Goldin and Sokoloff1982; Soko-
loff 1984). High labor mobility and frequent turnover were the norm, to which
mechanization was an adaptation.
Putting these attributes together, and eschewing the fruitless effort to select
one ofthem as the "single bullet" driving all ofthe others, what mattered most
was the emergence in the nineteenth century ofan indigenous American tech-
nical community, pursuing a learning trajectory to adapt European technolog-
ies to the American setting (cf. David 1974, chap. 1; Broadberry 1994b).
Hounshell (1984) throws much cold water on the notion of a continuous
American technological thread joining Eli Whitney to Henry Ford, but his
bookpresents numerous examples ofindividual mechanics who moved repeat-
edly from one industry to another during their careers, applying a common set
of skills and principles to a diverse set ofchallenges. A notable case is Henry
Leland, founder ofthe Cadillac Motor CarCompany, who began in 1863 as an
apprentice to a loom builder in Worcester, Massachusetts, moving on to Sam-
uel Colt's armory in Hartford, and then to the sewing-machine section at
Browne and Sharpe (p. 81). Through these years of employment, Leland
gained a generalized mastery ofthe cutting-edge machine technologies ofthat
day, to which he in turn contributed. As Rosenberg (1963) has argued, the high
mobility of individuals among firms as well as regions, and the flexibility of
machinery firms in adapting their skills to new industrial users, constituted a
powerful mechanism for diffusing new paradigms throughout the economy.
Even for a newer and more science-based technology like the telegraph, Israel
(1992) shows that improvements grew largely out ofa "shop culture" ofpracti-
cal experience, and many practitioners moved from the operating room into
the manufacture ofequipment. Other telegraph operators moved on to inven-
tive careers in still newer industries like the telephone and electrical machinery,
ofwhom Thomas Edison was only the most famou,s.
In a similar spirit, Thomson (1989) recounts the path from the sewing ma-
chine to mechanized shoe production at the end ofthe nineteenth century, trac-
ing the lines ofpersonal and technological linkage in minute detail. Thomson
places particular emphasis on the spread of knowledge through networks of
trade, or "learning by selling." During the early period of craft production,301 Can a Nation Learn? American Technology as a Network Phenomenon
many improvements originated for the simple motive of self-usage. But the
inventions that spread and were refined into an advanced state were those that
entered into commodity exchange, greatly widening the circle ofdiffusion and
feedback. Thomson shows that the impetus for technological change in shoe
manufactures often came from outside the industry, through the efforts of
"cross-over" inventors who saw an opportunity to apply their expertise in a
new setting (pp. 185, 203). He concludes: "Established and potential inventors
were integrated in a communications network that tied the diffusion and im-
provement ofsome machines to the birth and introduction ofothers.... New
machines came to sustain their own learning processes, pulled inventors in
to improve them, but at the same time generated inventors oriented to other
new operations.... By the time Goodyear developed its system ofmachines,
it could call on well-established solutions and professional inventors" (pp.
211-12).
8.2 Technological Independence in Cotton Textiles
These generalizations may be illustrated by the case of cotton textiles, the
largest early manufacturing industry in both the United States and Britain.
Aided by a protective tariff, the New England industry grew rapidly during the
1820s and 1830s on the basis of some famous innovations: the power 100m
(originally a British invention, but perfected in the United States); integration
ofspinning and weaving; and the dormitory or Lowell-Waltham system, under
which young unmarried women were recruited to work for a few years prior to
marriage-aninstitutional adaptation to labor scarcity. Although the dormitory
system disappeared with the advent ofmass immigration in the 1840s, in major
respects the industry was set on its course ofdevelopment for the next century.
American and British textiles technologies evolved very differently.2 In cot-
ton spinning, the two major technological alternatives were the ring and the
mule. The mule was a British specialty dating from the eighteenth century,
embodying the principle ofintermittent spinning: the spindle travels on its car-
riage while drawing out and spinning the yam, and then returns to its original
position while the yam is wound. The ring, descended from Arkwright's water
frame, was a continuous spinning machine, effecting both spinning and weav-
ing simultaneously. Continuous spinning simplified the machine-tending job,
but put extra strain on the cotton fibers and produced a coarser yam. Over
more than one hundred years, the pace ofdeveloplnent ofthese two competing
strategies was uneven. The mule was in the ascendancy from the 1830s, follow-
ing the introduction of the more highly mechanized self-actor. But the self-
acting mule never became dominant in the United States, because ofongoing
improvements in ring spinning, which increased the operating speed to 5,500
2. This section draws upon Saxonhouse and Wright (1984). The best technical account of the
evolution ofspinning technology is Catling (1970).302 Gavin Wright
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rpm in the 1850s, to 7,500 rpm by the 1870s (the Sawyer spindle), and to
10,000rpmby 1880 (the Rabbeth spindle). By the 1870s, American mule spin-
ning was on a path to extinction, and by 1907-8 the United States and United
Kingdom were at opposite ends ofthe international spectrum in their commit-
ments to their favored spinning technology (table 8.1).
How can we explain this divergence? Although critics of the British have
portrayed their love for the mule as an example oftechnological backwardness,
scholars such as Sandberg (1974) and Lazonick (1981) suggest thatthe choices
oftechnology were well-suited to initial conditions in the respective countries.
Mule spinning was a skilled male occupation, while ring spinning was a
machine-tendingjob that could be performed by girls and young women. Con-
tinuous spinning was less flexible, placing more stress on the cotton fibers;
hence it was better suited for longer-staple cottons used in long production
runs ofstandardized yams and cloth. The mule was better adapted to variations
in cottons and yam counts, and thus allowed Lancashire to take advantage of
its proximity to the world's largest cotton market in Liverpool, and to produce
for diverse markets all over the world. Thus, the original divergence had a
reasonably clear economic logic.3
For present purposes, the important point is that this logic of divergence
became more compelling over time, because of positive feedback from the
initial choice of technique to patterns of factor expansion and learning. The
British began with a skilled labor force, and extended this "factor endowment"
by training new mule spinners, through an informally organized program com-
prising "migration" (moving from machine to machine, or factory to factory),
"following-up" (attaching a young worker to an experienced worker), and
"picking up" (an even less formalized mode of learning by observing).4 The
3. Sandberg's analysis is complementary to that ofHarley (197'4), stressing the relative scarcity
of skilled labor in the United States. Lazonick's interpretation is more institutional, emphasizing
both craft unions and vertical specialization between spinning and weaving as factors favoring the
mule. Temin (1988) notes the role ofthe early U.S. tariffstructure in channeling production toward
the low-quality end of the product spectrum, and hence toward vertical integration and ring
spinning.
4. See the account in More (1980, 107-30) and the estimated wage structure in Boot (1995).303 Can a Nation Learn? American Technology as a Network Phenomenon
American industry began with an unskilled labor force and replaced it many
times over with new generations ofimmigrants. The dexterity and stamina of
the factory workforce undoubtedly improved over time, but the primary locus
of improvement was in the machinery, which soon came to be produced by
specialized firms. These textile-machinery producers continued to improve the
performance of ring-spinning machinery through cumulative incremental ad-
vance, moving on to the perfection of automatic weaving by the 1880s. Tech-
nology coevolved with the structure and labor force of the U.S. industry, in-
cluding its southward migration as ofthe late nineteenth century.
Thus the two leading national textile industries came into the twentieth cen-
tury with sharply contrasting systems. In each country, industry experts be-
lieved that theirs was the superior choice. Yet both industries were successful,
the two largest in the world before World War 1.
5 The "national" character of
these choices pertained not just to the identity ofthe technicians, but to their
coevolutionary interaction with domestic textile firms, the primary users.
American textile-machinery manufacturing had important technological
linkages to many other branches ofthe machine-tools industry. As early as the
1830s, machine shops that were initially attached to textile factories began to
diversify their product lines into steam engines, turbines, locomotives, and
other machine tools. Through a process that Rosenberg (1963) calls "techno-
logical convergence," a commonbody ofmetalworking and mechanicalknowl-
edge came to be applied to a diverse range of industries. In contrast to the
bifurcation across national boundaries, a tendency toward standardization
within the country was observed very early, promoted both by long-distance
sales of specialty firms and by the high geographic mobility of nineteenth-
century mechanics. Leading machine-tool firms like the Matteawan Manufac-
turing Company of Beacon, New York, trained several generations of expert
machinists only to find that these "alumni" left to take management positions
or to found their own firms in new locations. A study of the careers of ten
leading machinists found that they had worked for an average of5.5 employers
in 4.2 industrial centers (Lozier 1986, 33, 202).
8.3 Conceptual Issues
The existence ofan American technological network in the nineteenth cen-
tury seems well established. But what forces or institutions held it together?
Why and in what sense was it national? For many years economics has
grappled with the question, why does any private operator invest in the genera-
tion of new knowledge? To be sure, these investments are productive. But as
5. The ironic implication ofrecent research is that, despite its technological sophistication and
leadership in productivity, the U.S. textile industry itself may never have achieved true interna-
tional competitiveness. Forevidence that most ofthe antebellum industry required tariffprotection
for survival, see Harley (1992). Yet this industry generated innovations that ultimately set the
standard for the world!304 Gavin Wright
formulated most clearly by Arrow (1962), investments in knowledge differ in
two fundamental ways from conventional investments: they are subject to se-
vere uncertainty, and even if successful, the discoverer may not be able to ap-
propriate the resulting returns. The textbook conclusion is that market econo-
mies will tend to underinvest in knowledge generation.
In grappling with these issues, one must distinguish between "basic" tech-
nology on the one hand-pure ideas or information about scientific prin-
ciples-and applied, or practical technologies on the other, which typically
combine abstract ideas with a large component of"know-how," orexperience-
based knowledge. Uncertainty and appropriability are problems in both cases,
but the institutions identified as mitigators of these problems tend to operate
most effectively at the applied end of the spectrum: patents or other forms
of intellectual property rights; cooperative or nonprofit research institutions;
government procurement policy; private market power, existing or potential,
which offers the promise of sufficient "first-mover advantages" to reward the
investments; large, diversified research portfolios that protect against concen-
trated risk. Industries with long track records ofsuccessful research and devel-
opment programs are those that have "solved" the uncertainty and appropria-
bility problems through some combination of institutional arrangements like
these. Forexample, Teece (1992) argues that firms investing in new technolog-
ies seek to embed their new knowledge deeply in product design, marketing,
specific assets, personnel systems, and so forth, to make them as firm-specific
as possible.
Yet this list of possibilities seems inadequate to account for nineteenth-
centuryAmerica's enthusiasmfor new technologies. The search for patents was
sometimes crucial, but many innovations were not patentable, and many pat-
ents were difficult to enforce orwere subject to protracted and costly litigation.
Government demand was important in a few areas like firearms. But neither
the size of government nor the size and national market power of the largest
private companies were anywhere near what they became in the twentieth cen-
tury. Where else can we tum?
An article by Robert Allen (1983) considered this question and proposed a
mechanism that he called "collective invention." Allen noted the steady incre-
mental progress in the iron and steel industries of England and the United
States, along such dimensions as the height offurnaces, the level ofblast tem-
perature, and the spread offast driving. These improvements were not gener-
ally patentable, yet the firms involved disseminated all the relevant facts about
their latest operating results, and this information in tum became the basis
for further improvements elsewhere. The question is, why. Allen suggests four
possible mechanisms.
1. Owners and managers may have had professional ambitions that would
be advanced by publishing information about their firm's operation and perfor-
mance.
2. Where construction entailed participation by suppliers, contractors, and305 Can a Nation Learn? American Technology as a Network Phenomenon
consulting engineers, it may have been more difficult to maintain secrecy than
to release the information.
3. Releasing information may actually have been profitable, ifthe firm had
a stake in asset values that would be enhanced by dissemination (such as the
value ofregional mines).
4. Firms may have been party to norms of reciprocity, explicit or implicit,
whereby divulging information gave them access to similar information from
the other firms in the group.
These mechanisms have many plausible applications to nineteenth-century
America. The role ofprofessional ambitions became increasingly important as
the century progressed, with the formation ofengineering societies and grow-
ing interactions between business and universities. But long before "profes-
sionalization," skilled mechanics and machinists openly published detailed
specifications of their machinery as a form of self-advertising.6 Hoke (1990,
252) notes the pattern ofhiring experienced watchmaking mechanics from es-
tablished firms, as a mode of spreading a technology lodged in a "subculture
ofwatch factory mechanics." These effects were intensified by the rise ofspe-
cialized firms and individuals committed to "invention" as their primary occu-
pation (Thomson 1993, 88-93). Whereas a chef with a recipe has reason to
keep it secret, a machinery maker with command ofa "general purpose tech-
nology" has every reason to spread the news and expand the range ofits poten-
tial customers. Misa (1995) identifies producer-userinteraction as the core ele-
mentin the evolution ofa distinctiveAmerican steel technology, taking up such
examples as railroads, skyscrapers, factories, and automobiles.
A collective interest in property values could also serve as the basis for pub-
lic or quasi-public support for investments in knowledge. Land-rich Stephen
Van Rensselaer sponsored one ofthe first geological surveys inAmerica in the
New York county that bears his name, for obvious economic reasons (Hen-
drickson 1961, 358). By 1860, twenty-nine of thirty-three state governments
had followed his example. The funding of state geological surveys was the
leading form of direct aid that state governments provided for science in the
antebellum era. In their dual role as landowners and suppliers oftransportation
services,American railroads also sponsored geological surveys and metallurgi-
cal research (Mowery and Rosenberg 1989, 38).
But behind these mechanisms and others that one might cite was an over-
arching factor serving to enhance their efficacy, namely the scale of the na-
tional economy. The importance ofscale in the incentive structure for innova-
tion is a major implication of models from the new or endogenous growth
theory, pioneered by Paul Romer (1986, 1990). We may not be able to identify
with precision the microlevel basis for positive returns to new knowledge, but
6. For specific examples, see Calvert (1967, 7). Calvert also notes the popularity ofthe sections
in early mechanical-engineering periodicals called "shop kinks" or "shop hints:' in which ideas
and techniques developed in one shop were broadcast for all interested parties to share.306 Gavin Wright
as Romer (1996, 204) argues, "a nonrival idea can be copied and communi-
cated, so its value increases in proportion to the size ofthe market in which it
can be used.... Ifpeople can sometimes establish property rights over a non-
rival good like an operating system or a recipe ... differences in scale will
change the rewards for producing new ideas." Many of the mechanisms dis-
cussed above are scale economies at the industry or national level. Only an
economy of sufficient size could support specialized machine-tools firms, in-
ventors, and professional associations. The size of the national economy
clearly differentiated the United States from otherresource-abundant countries
ofrecent settlement, such as Argentina, Australia, and Canada; and by the mid-
nineteenth century, extensive growth was rapidly pushing the United States
into a unique total-national-income size bracket.
But scale is a tricky economic concept. Mere bigness counts for little ifthe
regions of the country are not integrated economically; other things equal,
longer distances actually reduce the size of the relevant market. Sokoloff
(1988) finds that inventive activity as measured by patents tended to concen-
trate in locations where cheap transportation offered access to larger markets.
But even if the costs of distance are reduced by investment in transportation
and communication, national "market size" would not be effective as an incen-
tive to innovators unless the country were reasonably homogeneous in its pat-
terns ofconsumer demand, and in the geographic characteristics to which tech-
nological change is adapting. Thus, the question of scale is intimately linked
to what might seem to be cultural questions: why and in what sense were the
learning networks national in scope? Fundamentally, they were national be-
cause the "problem-solving environment" was increasingly national, and this
unity of focus reflected the growing integration of national product markets
and the high level ofinternal population mobility across state lines.
Ofcourse this national differentiation had a cultural dimension. A Scottish
visitor of 1849-50 complained that American mineralogists disdained to label
geological formations with the names of European localities, but insisted on
using an independent national terminology (Bruce 1987, 26). But whereas
such chauvinism in a small country might have generated isolation and back-
wardness, for the United States national technological particularity was posi-
tively reinforced by the ongoing expansion ofthe economy and ofthe relevant
technological community along national lines. Scale economies may ulti-
mately reside as much in the way knowledge is organized-the terminology,
the conceptual categories, the standardized routines for testing and measure-
ment-as in the incentives facing profit-seeking producers and innovators. But
the realm of "ideas" and the realm of "things" were continually interacting.
Historians of technology stress that knowledge often diffuses through the
spread ofproducers' goods that physically embody esoteric scientific informa-
tion and procedures, as in the example ofthe Prony dynamometer, which was
of great importance in the indigenous American development of hydraulic
turbines. According to Constant (1983, 186), in contrast to the European prac-307 Can a Nation Learn? American Technology as a Network Phenomenon
tice ofcustom turbine design, American producers "concentrated on develop-
ment ofcheap but highly efficient, empirically designed 'stock' wheels which
could be merchandised like agricultural implements or hardware." By the
1880s, although the technology ofturbine design was patentable and proprie-
tary, knowledge about turbine testing was communal and consensual, "the
common property of a weB-defined community of practitioners" (p. 194).7
National engineering associations and technical curricula were institutional-
izations ofthe national focus ofnineteenth-century technological networks.
An illustration ofthe advanced state ofthe American technological commu-
nity as ofthe 1880s may be found in the contrasting experience of the South.
Although the term "national" has been used to this point as a convenient short-
hand, in many ways the South was not a part ofthe larger national accumula-
tion of knowledge. Regional production problems were different in essential
ways, from wage rates, education, and race to the resource base and the cli-
mate. But the South did not develop an early indigenous regional technological
community, and found that the startup costs of a late beginning were high.
When a group ofGeorgians set out in the 1880s to establish a state school of
technology as a spearhead for regional industrial development, they chose the
"shop culture" approach of the Worcester Free Institute over the "school cul-
ture" approach associated with Boston Tech (later MIT). The result was highly
practical "trade school" training, producing "graduates who could work as ma-
chinists or as shop foremen, but who were not well prepared for engineering
analysis or original research" (McMath 1985, 9). This may have been the only
feasible choice at that time.
Even a quarter-century later, when U.S. Steel acquired the largest southern
steel producer and embarked on an ambitious project ofupgrading and mod-
ernization, it encountered a series ofunexpected problems in labor costs and
discipline, idiosyncrasies in resource quality and conditions ofextraction, and
problems with productquality control and marketing.After their initial burstof
enthusiasm, the company largely neglected its Birmingham interests. Southern
nationalists have seen this as part of a conspiracy to keep them down, but a
more plausible interpretation is that the company's technological expertise-
representative ofthe emerging "national" technology-was not well suited to
conditions in the South (Wright 1986, 156-77).
8.4 American Mineral Development as a Knowledge Industry
One of the earliest and largest American technological networks was fo-
cused on exploitation of the nation's mineral potential. Contrary to learned
intuition, resource-based development was not "low-tech," and world leader-
ship in mineral production was not primarily based on geological endowment.
David and Wright (1997) show that U.S. mineral production as of 1913 was































Fig. 8.3 Copper mine production, United States and Chile, and real U.S. price
ofcopper, 1845-1976
Source: Schmitz (1979, 63-78, 270-72).
substantially disproportionate to what we now know to be the country's 1913
share ofworld mineral reserves. Within a thirty-year period, the United States
achieved leadership or near leadership in coal, iron ore, copper, lead, zinc,
silver, tungsten, molybdenum, petroleum, arsenic, phosphate, antimony, mag-
nesite, mercury, salt, gold, and bauxite, a degree of simultaneity too extreme
to have been coincidental. The example ofcopperis illustrative (fig. 8.3). Until
the 1880s, Chile was the world's leading copperproducer, and by the 1930s had
nearly recovered its number-one ranking. During the fifty years in between, the
action was in the United States.
Developing America's mineral potential was fundamentally a collective
learning phenomenon, a return to decades ofinvestment in exploration, trans-
portation, and the knowledge infrastructure of mineral deposits; in training
mining engineers and geologists; and in metallurgical revolutions that ex-
panded the range of minerals that could be profitably extracted. Provision of
geological information was the initial step. Geologists were among the most
conspicuous ofthose antebellum scientists listed in the DictionaryofAmerican
Biography (about 14 percent of the total) who drew livelihoods chiefly from
private industry rather than government or educational institutions (Bruce
1987, 139). As noted, state geological surveys were the leading form ofdirect
aid for science in the antebellum era. The states supported not only the field-
work of geologists, but also the publication of their sometimes voluminous
reports (pp. 166-67).
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early instance ofthe role ofthese surveys and geologists' involvement in explo-
ration and mineral-resource exploitation. A federal survey under the direction
of Charles T. Jackson, a leading geologist and chemist in Boston, was com-
pleted in 1850, providing the first geological maps adequate to support rational
exploration and development work. This venture launched not only the devel-
opment ofthese copper fields, but a number ofscientific careers. Josiah Whit-
ney, a young protege ofJackson's who had been sent off to Europe to pursue
interests in chemistry, returned in the summer of 1845 to work as a geologist
for a mining company. Forsaking chemistry, Whitney soon joined the staffof
Jackson's survey in 1847, and within a few years had established himself as a
leading industrial consultant. "Making five hundred dollars a month, he could
not afford to be a Yale professor" (Bruce 1987, 139-40). His reputation was
further enhanced by his publication the following year of The Metallic Wealth
ofthe United States, the first comprehensive work on American ore deposits, a
book that became widely known and helped him gain a position as director.of
a state survey for California in 1860.
Despite Whitney's remark about relative salaries, university professors of
that era could sometimes be highly entrepreneurial while on the job. An early
example was J. P. Lesley, who graduated from the University ofPennsylvania
in 1838, and then worked on the first state geological survey.8 After a decade
in the ministry, he published A Manual ofCoal and Its Topography in 1856,
and in the same year became secretary ofthe American Iron Association. He
also worked as a private consultant, and in 1857 his office stationery carriedthe
following letterhead: "Geology and Topography. Geological and other Maps
constructed; Surveys of Coal Lands made; Mineral Deposits examined; Geo-
logical Opinions given to guide purchasers, and Reports made to Owners and
Agents. Orders for elaborate Topographical Surveys from Rail-road and other
companies, will be executed in scientific principles, and in the highest style of
the art." Two years laterhejoinedthe faculty ofhis alma mater, was made dean
of the science department in 1872, and dean of the new Towne Scientific
School in 1875. He was librarian, secretary, and vice president oftheAmerican
Philosophical Society, and a charter member ofthe National Academy ofSci-
ences. During all this time he continued his consulting activities, traveling in
1863 to Europe for the Pennsylvania Railroad to study the Bessemer steel pro-
cess. He also served as state geologist, directed the second Pennsylvania geo-
logical survey, and for four years edited a weekly newspaper, United States
Railroad and Mining Register. The overlapping sectoral engagements in Les-
ley's career vividly illustrate the learning spillovers among mineral explora-
tion, transportation, and industrial development.9
With the opening ofthe trans-Mississippi west after the Civil War, there was
8. This account is adapted from Pursell (1972, 241-45).
9. The chemical labs set up by railroads and steel companies during the 1860s for testing materi-
als were the first scientific laboratories in American industry. See Rosenberg (1985).310 Gavin Wright
a commensurate expansion in the scale of resources committed to geological
surveys. A number of ad hoc projects culminated in the establishment of the
U.S. Geological Survey in 1879. Under directors Clarence King and J. W.
Powell, the Survey emerged as the leading governmental research agency of
the nineteenth century. The payoffto its early topographical and metallurgical
work had a lasting impact on popular appreciation ofthe practical benefits of
scientific research (Manning 1967, 4-14; Paul 1960; Owen 1975, 225). Al-
though private professional work while on the Survey staffwas not permitted,
the organization acquired a reputation as an ideal stepping-stone toward career
success in the mining sector (Spence 1970, 60). The Survey was particularly
effective in changing attitudes toward petroleum geology in the industry, by
publishing reliable field data and popularizing the anticlinal theory ofthe oil-
bearing strata-adistinctively American doctrine (Owen 1975, 56,95). While
the major elements ofthe theory had been worked out before 1900, the discov-
ery in 1911 of the rich Cushing pool in Oklahoma offered tangible evidence
of its practical value. For the next fifteen years, most new crude discoveries
were based on the surface mapping of anticlines (Williamson et al. 1963,
45-46).
Over roughly this same period, the United States also became the foremost
location for education in mining engineering and metallurgy. Until the 1860s,
advanced American mining students often attended the Bergakademie in Frei-
berg, Saxony; butwith the founding ofthe Columbia School ofMines in 1864,
enrollments abroad largely ceased. As early as 1871, mining expert John A.
Church declared Columbia to be "one ofthe best schools in the world-more
scientific than Freiberg, more practical than Paris" (quoted in Spence 1970,
38). The fact that an institution in New York City was training engineers for
work in remote western localities is strong evidence that learning was nation-
ally structured. But by 1893, more than twenty American schools offered de-
grees in mining (Christy 1893). Enrollment continued to grow over the next
ten years or more, especially in the western states. With over 300 students
enrolled in its mining college in 1903, the University ofCalifornia claimed to
be "without doubt the largest mining college in the world" (Read 1941, 84).
The continuing flow oftrained American mining specialists was reflected in a
distinctly national professional identity. When the British Institution ofMining
and Metallurgy held its first meeting in London in 1892, the organizers "found
it more than a little irksome to have to acknowledge that in the United States
some such organization had been operating successfully for nearly twenty
years" (Wilson 1992, 8-9).
The national identity ofmining engineers derived, notjustfrom their training
within the United States, but from the interaction between mining schools and
industry. Columbia organized the Summer School ofPractical Mining, which
helped students become familiar with working conditions they would meet
after graduation. Professor Robert H. Richards perfected the Mining Labora-
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out by students (Christy 1893, 461). Mining engineers increasingly assumed
managerial and executive roles within large firms, and this expectation came
to be reflected in the curricula ofmining schools (Ochs 1992). Herbert Hoover,
surely the most famous mining engineer ofthis era, favored this trend toward
combining executive and technical functions, viewing it as an American
strength (Hoover 1909, 185~91). The contrast was with the European tradition
oftraining mining engineers to serve as inspectors, and in regulatory positions
directing the activities ofstate mining monopolies. Large mining corporations
became increasingly prominent after 1900.
10 Surveys of mining school grad-
uates, however, indicate that most maintained professional independence
throughout their careers, taking on a wide range ofjob assignments and con-
sulting positions, often founding independent companies (Ochs 1992; Spence
1970, 79, 136-39, 275).
Perhaps the best evidence ofthe distinctive national character ofAmerican
mining engineers is their role in overseas development. A 1917 manpower cen-
sus for military purposes counted 7,500 mining engineers, 2,112 ofthem with
working experience in foreign countries. Although Canada and Mexico were
the two largest of these, the experience was in fact widely dispersed among
the continents ofthe world (table 8.2). A survey of graduates ofthe Colorado
School of Mines between 1900 and 1940 found that 64 percent had worked
abroad at some time, 39 percent for several years (Ochs 1992). The American
impact was notable inAustralia, where into the 1880s most ofthe largestmines
were managed by Cornishmen, who had much practical experience but were
untrained in metallurgy and resistant to the use of new technology. A turning
point came with the move in 1886 to recruit highly paid engineers and metal-
lurgists from the Rocky Mountain states, a decision that "linkedAustralia to a
new powerhouse of skills and attitudes" (Blainey 1969, 154, 252). In South
Africa, because hard quartz-rock mining required techniques "unknown to
most British mining engineers," Americans were offered princely salaries to
come and direct mining operations in the 1880s and 1890s. An American
served as the state mining engineer in the Transvaal in 1888, another was the
first president of the South African Association of Engineers and Architects,
and a third was one of the first presidents of the Chemical and Metallurgical
Society formed in 1894 (De WaaI1985).
Many of these themes are well illustrated by the case of copper. The early
developments in Michigan have been touched upon already; beginning in the
1870s, the national totals were augmented by production from newly discov-
ered deposits in Arizona and Montana, though Michigan production continued
to grow absolutely until the 1920s. What truly propelled the industry into the
twentieth century, however, was a revolution in metallurgy, overwhelmingly
an American technological achievement. In the 1880s and 1890s, the major
10. Of the fifty-eight U.S. companies represented in the world's largest hundred as of 1912,
nearly one-third were in minerals, including petroleum (Schmitz 1995).312 Gavin Wright

















































































breakthroughs were the adaptation of the Bessemer process to copper con-
verting, and the introduction ofelectrolysis on a commercial scale for the final
refining of copper. The dramatic new development of the first decade of the
twentieth century was the successful application of the Jackling method of
large-scale, nonselective mining, using highly mechanized techniques to re-
move all material from the mineralized area, waste as well as metal-bearing
ore. Complementary to these techniques, indeed essential to their commercial
success, was the use of the oil flotation process in concentrating the ore. Oil
flotation called for and made possible extremely fiq.e grinding, which reduced
milling losses sufficiently to make exploitation oflow-grade "porphyry" cop-
pers economically feasible. 11
Together these techniques made possible a steady reduction in the average
11. This account draws primarily upon Parsons (1933) and Schmitz (1986, 403-5).313 Can a Nation Learn? American Technology as a Network Phenomenon








































Sources: Elliott et al. 1937, 374; Leong et al. 1940.
grade ofAmerican copper ore, as shown in table 8.3. By contrast, in copper-
rich Chile-where output was stagnant-yields averaged 10-13 percent be-
tween 1880 and 1910·(Przeworski 1980,26,183,197). From these facts alone,
one might infer that the United States had simply pressed its internal margin
ofextraction further than Chile, into higher-cost ores. But figure 8.3 makes it
evident that the real price of copper was declining during this very period,
confirming that the fall in yields was an indication of technological progress.
Indeed, there is an exponential link between the reduction in yield and the
expansion of ore reserves, through a formula known to geologists as Lasky's
law, an inverse relationship between the grade ofore and the size ofthe deposit
(Lasky 1950). Capital requirements and long time horizons made copper an
industry for corporate giants, enterprises that internalized many ofthe comple-
mentarities and spillovers in copper technology (Schmitz 1986). But these
firms also drew extensively upon national infrastructural investments in geo-
logical knowledge and in the training ofmining engineers.
8.5 The Organization ofKnowledge: Chemical
Engineering as anAmerican Innovation
Textbooks say that, around the tumofthe twentieth century, the technologies
of the first industrial revolution (steam, coal, and iron) gave way to the more
science-based technologies of the second industrial revolution (electricity,
chemicals, and internal combustion). The change in underlying science shifted
technology from its nineteenth-century demands for tangible capital and re-
sources toward more intangible forms of capital such as knowledge and ad-
vanced education (Abramovitz and David 1996). From this vantage point, the
rise of the industrial research laboratories depicted in figure 8.1 may be seen
as a response to the opportunities created by these new technologies, and a
vehicle for propelling them forward.314 Gavin Wright
This description accounts for one aspect of the change between the centu-
ries, but understates the extent to which the new American industries of the
twentieth century drew upon the legacy of the nineteenth-century national
technological community. To give a few examples:
1. As in the case ofcopper, the electrolytic metallurgical revolution ofthe
1890s was an extension of the long drive to develop and exploit the nation's
mineral potential. Charles Martin Hall's electrolytic process of 1886 culmi-
nated a decades-long "search for cheap aluminum;' and instantly raised the
value of bauxite, or aluminum ore. 12 From the "worthless" brine under Mid-
land, Michigan, the Dow chemical company was able to manufacture some
150 profitable electrolytic bromine products (Levenstein 1995).
2. Both electrical and chemical industries depended heavily on the nation's
long-standing expertise in metal manufactures and metalworking. Having in-
vented cheap aluminum, the forerunner ofAlcoa had to draw upon the metal-
lurgical, ingot-casting, and metalworking expertise of the Pittsburgh area, to
perfect its manufacturing methods and develop new uses for the product. To
facilitate this process, it followed a strategy ofpublishing its research results
in full (Graham and Pruitt 1990, chap. 1). Alcoa and other electrochemicals
firms worked closely with machinists and mechanical engineers, because
equipment design was critical to their research. Although the Germans were
the undisputed world leaders in chemical science before World War I, an in-
formed observer wrote in 1900: ''As far as I have been able to judge from my
personal experience, the American Manufacturers [sic] are far ahead of all
others, and their success has been entirely due to the apparatus employed"
(quoted in Trescott 1982, 12).
3. The institutions ofhigher education and technical training that grew up
originally around civil, mechanical, and mining engineering were well posi-
tioned to adapt to the new technological order. Trained chemists were em-
ployed in industrial laboratories as early as the 1860s, but before 1900 they
chiefly worked on routine materials testing, well within the boundaries offron-
tier science of that time (Rosenberg 1985). Nonetheless, the pattern of aca-
demic adaptation to changing industrial demands was well established, in con-
trast to the traditions of training state engineers in France and Germany
(Lundgreen 1990). Well before World War I, the United States became the
world leader in years ofhigher education per capita, notwithstanding its lag in
basic science (Maddison 1987, table A-12). Patterns of training and profes-
sional specialization also reflected a distinct American style, as illustrated by
the rise ofchemical engineering.
The origins ofthe term "chemical engineer" are, shrouded in mystery. Some
trace it back to antiquity, but an immediate forerunner to U.S. adoption was a
12. Trescott (1981) rejects the oft-heard statement that the methods of Hall and his French
counterpart, L. T. Heroult, were virtually identical. Hall's method dissolved bauxite, while Euro-
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series oflectures by George E. Davis ofManchester, England, in 1888. Elabo-
ration ofthe hybrid as a professional specialty was, according to its historians,
an American innovation (Gu6don 1980; Trescott 1982). Although the nature
of the specialty became clarified only some time after its founding, from the
beginning the concept was not the same as applied chemistry. In fact, it grew
most directly out ofmechanical engineering, with a focus on the design, con-
struction, and maintenance ofplant and apparatus to perform chemical opera-
tions. MIT established its first course in 1888, and was quickly followed by
Pennsylvania (1892), Tulane (1894), Wisconsin (1898), Michigan (1898), and
many others. The American Institute of Chemical Engineers, a professional
association, was founded in 1908.
What came to distinguish chemical engineering was the concept of "unit
operations," a term coined by Arthur D. Little in 1915, to refer to the notion of
breaking down chemical processes into elemental components such as evapo-
ration, filtration, grinding, crushing, and so on, which had features common to
many different chemical contexts. This increase in the level ofabstraction and
generality gave the core concept something ofthe effect ofa "general-purpose
technology." 13 The contrast was with the tradition of chemical analysis, in
which the chemist developed an intimate but particularized knowledge ofspe-
cific substances. Although Little's concept was not codified in the form of a
textbook until the 1920s, the codification reflected the practices of industry-
university relationships emerging over a more extended period oftime (Soros
1980; Trescott 1982; Misa 1985). Certainly a strong orientation toward practi-
cal industrial utility was a feature ofchemical engineering from the beginning.
Indeed, Arthur D. Little was not afaculty member at the time ofhis 1915 report
to the president ofMIT, but his consulting firm was an active employer ofMIT
graduates. Not long after, nearly all the MIT chemical engineering faculty were
engaged as consultants or employees in the oil industry (Weber 1980). At MIT
and elsewhere, enrollments in the new field grew rapidly (table 8.4).
The most dramatic return to the new professional specialty came with the
rise ofpetrochemicals during the 1920s. Here we truly have a marriage ofold
and new learning, as the entire technology of petroleum discovery, drilling,
refining, and utilization had been an American specialty for nearly a century
before. It can also legitimately be considered a return to scale at the national
level, because the search for by-products was an outgrowth ofthe vast Ameri-
can enterprise of petroleum refining. Prior to the 1920s, however, there was
little contact between petroleum companies and the chemical industry. With
the shift ofbasic feedstock from coal tar to petroleum, the United States surged
into the forefront, building on close university-industry partnerships like that
between New Jersey Standard and MIT at the research facility in Baton Rouge,
Louisiana (Landau and Rosenberg 1992). As the chemical engineer Peter Spitz
13. This analogy is suggested by Rosenberg (1998), with a theoretical citation to Bresnahan and
Trajtenberg (1995).316 Gavin Wright



































(1988, xiii) has written: "Regardless ofthe fact that Europe's chemical industry
was for a long time more advanced than that in the United States, the future of
organic chemicals was going to be related to petroleum, not coal, as soon as
companies such as Union Carbide, Standard Oil (New Jersey), Shell, and Dow
turned their attention to the production ofpetrochemicals." AfterWorld War II,
the German chemical industry required a substantial institutional and attitudi-
nal readjustment to the petroleum base, which by then had become the world
standard (Stokes 1994).
Ifchemical engineering transformed the configuration by which technologi-
cal knowledge was accumulated, the discipline itself was transformed by its
interactions with institutionalized research programs at major corporations. Du
Pont in particular, which launched an ambitious research agenda in basic sci-
ence beginning in the late 1920s, experienced the inadequacies of the then-
current level ofrigor in chemical engineering (with the possible exception of
MIT). Under the leadership ofAllan Colburn and Thomas Chilton, Du Pont
contrived to put the discipline on a firmer scientific and mathematical footing.
Another Du Pont chemical engineer, John Howard Perry, published the Chemi-
cal Engineer's Handbook in the 1930s, which sold over 150,000 copies over
the next twenty years (Hounshell and Smith 1988, 275-85).
Despite the powerful influence ofDu Pont and other large research-oriented
companies, scientists maintained an independent professional identity. With
academic employment as an option, companies often had to adapt their em-
ployment conditions to match the individual freedoms of a university setting
(Wise 1980). At Alcoa, researchers were encouraged to "identify closely with
their engineering and scientific professions, to attend professional conferences
and society meetings, to write papers and generally to keep in touch with
things going on in the outside scientific community" (Graham and Pruitt 1990,
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Pont, Charles Stine listed the advantages of recruiting Ph.D.'s as one of the
prime reasons, holding out only the possibility that the project might lead to
practical applications-though in the end it certainly did (Hounshell and
Smith 1988, 223). Although company recruiters stressed the advantages ofthe
absence ofteaching 0), top research scientists were also eager to publish their
findings in professionaljoumals, often a subject ofdisputes with the company
(e.g., p. 238). At Du Pont the most productive research teams did not stay
togetherfor more than a few years at a time, because ofdepartures for universi-
ties or other employment (pp. 243, 283, 285). Through all its years ofsuccess,
Du Pont never settled on a lasting institutional solution to these issues (Houn-
shell 1992).
This is not meant to imply that the entire corporate research enterprise was
continually fraught with contradictions and instability. To the contrary, Du
Pont's underlying commitment was firm. The point is that the evolution of
American technological learning was shaped by the interactions between
profit-seeking firms and semi-independent professional scientists, and this fact
placed limits on the corporation's ability to appropriate knowledge and channel
technologies in their most favored directions. The contrast is with Germany,
which resisted chemical engineering as an autonomous discipline until the
1960s, opting instead for a team-based approach to the design of chemical
plants and apparatus, combining chemists with mechanical engineers and other
specialists (Gu6don 1980; Schoenemann 1980). From a technical standpoint
this solution may have beenjustas good. But whether it would have worked in
America is doubtful.
What distinguished the u.S. chemical industry internationally was not so
much the giant "all around" companies, but the numbers and vitality of
smaller, more specialized firms (Arora and Gambardella 1998). The coexis-
tence and complementarity oflarge and small technology-based firms has been
a persistent feature ofthe United States in major twentieth-centuryindustries.
8.6 Organized Corporate Research and National Learning Networks
Ifthe argument ofthis paper is correct, it raises the question ofwhat became
of American learning networks across the rest of the twentieth century, and
specifically what were the implications of organized industrial research for
the strong national orientation of the networks they inherited. Because these
networks were only partly visible and not subject to precise measurement, any
proposed account oftheir changing shape and direction through time must be
tentative. But available evidence seems consistent with the view that the first
generations of formalized research structures actually intensified the national
distinctiveness ofAmerican collective learning. Ultimately, however, progress
toward increasingly abstract general scientific principles has been a force for
the globalization oftechnological communities.
This conjecture begins with the evident correlation between research labora-318 Gavin Wright
tories and the rise oflarge integrated corporations producing primarily for the
national market. The essay by Steven Usselman (chap. 2 in this volume) calls
attention to the powerful drive toward research coordination in the case ofthe
railroad industry, whose capital stock really did consist of an interconnected
national network. But the railroads were an extreme case. Most of the corpo-
rate entities that came out of the turn-of-the-century merger wave were or-
iented toward the national market, and Chandlerian coordination between
production and distribution was central to the performance of those that
succeeded. The sponsors of early research laboratories were major corpora-
tions with market power, such as General Electric, Westinghouse, Du Pont,
Eastman Kodak, andAT&T. Indeed, protecting that marketpowerthrough stra-
tegic patent development was in many cases a prime motive for initiating cor-
porate research (Reich 1985).
But when corporate research labs evolved into a more progressive role, as
they often did whatever the original intentions, more often than not their suc-
cess took the form of new product development. The flow of new products
often seemed to be driven by the internal logic of a technological trajectory,
but their commercial success was unavoidably linked to the tastes and budgets
ofAmerican households. The era from the 1920s to the 1960s gave rise to the
theory ofthe "product cycle," according to which new products developed first
in the United States because they drew upon new scientific knowledge, butalso
because they tended to be responsive to the wants of high-income American
consumers, for telephones, automobiles, refrigerators, cameras, radios, nylons,
cellophane, and many other novelties. The observation that some ofthese de-
mand patterns were cultural idiosyncrasies rather than income effects only un-
derscores the inference that producer-consumer interaction intensified the na-
tional distinctiveness ofthe learning process.
Product-demand channels were reinforced by improved coordination be-
tween university training and the specifications of corporate employment.
These systems also tended to be national in scope. The establishment ofuni-
form standards for graduate degrees under the American Association of Uni-
versities was a self-conscious effort at network creation, as a means ofenhanc-
ing the reputation and effectiveness ofthe university system. The institutional
arrangements were peculiarlyAmerican: mass provision ofundergraduate edu-
cation as a means of financing research and graduate training (Geiger 1986,
17-18, 68). Close linkages between university instruction and industrial de-
mands for trained personnel was an accepted pattern from the late nineteenth
century (Rosenberg and Nelson 1994). In the 1920s, the movement for techni-
cal standardization to achieve the "elimination of.,waste in materials" spilled
over into formalized systems to define employee qualifications and job speci-
fications, for "the elimination ofwaste in people" (Noble 1977,82-83). Both
sides of the exchange were nationally defined, often at considerable variance
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expectation that career paths in engineering would ultimately lead to positions
in management, and this combination was a peculiarAmerican specialty (Rae
1979).
Critics of American capitalism often interpret these developments as evi-
dence ofthe excessive influence oflarge corporations on the direction oftech-
nological change and on the research and training decisions of universities.
Corporate domination was never complete, however. The article by Lamoreaux
and Sokoloff (chap. 1 in this volume) points to the continued vitality ofinde-
pendent inventors well into the twentieth century, as indicated by the registra-
tion of patents. Although the importance of in-house corporate research was
on the ascendancy during the interwar period, according to David Mowery
(1995) these facilities were complementary to externally contracted research
services, and often functioned as a way to monitor and evaluate innovations
originating elsewhere-mainly, in that era, elsewhere within the United States.
At the universities, advice on employment opportunities may have been wel-
comed by both faculty and students, but the independence of academic re-
search agendas and career paths is just as persistent a feature ofthe American
tradition (Servos 1980). It would be more appropriate to say, therefore, that
the interwar period was characterized by the crystallization of an advanced,
internally compatible national network ofinnovation, within which organized
corporate research was one major component. This view is quite compatible
with that advanced by Leslie Hannah (chap. 7 in this volume), which suggests
that the premierAmerican corporations were not endowed with unusually long
life, and seen in isolation they were more like than unlike their counterparts in
other advanced nations. Much of their distinctive performance derived from
their place in the dense networks ofthe U.S. economy.
But it is difficult to distinguish forces that may have been inherent in the
drive for economic and institutional coordination, from the broader trends in
the global economy during this era. The interwar years were a time of eco-
nomic nationalism around the world, of disruption in the international trade
and payments system, and ofimpending military crises that drove many coun-
tries toward self-sufficiency in technology as well as resources. Subsequently,
the events ofWorld War II pushed the United States into a position ofscience-
based technological leadership far beyond anything that would have been gen-
erated by normal economic forces (Nelson and Wright 1992). At that time the
American market was highly idiosyncratic, not just because ofnational tastes
but because American incomes were so much higher than those of any other
country in the world. With the postwar liberalization ofworld trade, dispersion
ofnatural-resource supplies around the globe, and economic recovery in coun-
tries that had been devastated by the war, the extremes ofnational differentia-
tion have greatly receded, increasing the degree of"technological congruence"
between nations (Abramovitz and David 1996).
A more fundamental force behind the attenuation of national networks is320 Gavin Wright
that modem technologies increasingly draw upon science, and scientific net-
works are inherently international. Although the distinction between "scien-
tific" and "nonscientific" technologies is difficult to define rigorously, the core
idea is straightforward: scientific technologies draw upon general, abstract, and
universal principles, as opposed to empirical observations and trial and error.
Almost by definition, scientific innovations are more readily transferable from
one application and one location to another.(Arora and Gambardella 1994). It
certainly appears that the "technology of technological change" has changed
in this way, for reasons broadly associated with the evolution oforganized re-
search structures, academic and governmental as well as corporate.
Patent counts are by no means comprehensive measures of technological
change, but the geographic origins of patents can give us some information
about technological networks, and the evidence seems to support this view in
broad terms. Between 1870 and 1930, more than 90 percent of U.S. patents
were assigned to U.S. residents, with no apparent trend during this period.
Between 1963 and 1968, the figure fell to 80 percent, and by the late 1970s to
60 percent. During the 1980s the share continued to fall, and in the 1990s it
has stabilized atjustover 50 percent. Ofcourse these aggregate trends obscure
significant variation between industries. But the trend toward internationaliza-
tion seems to be strongest in those fields characterized by existence ofa strong
science base, and the presence oflarge managerial companies. 14
This interpretation does not imply that the countries of the world are con-
verging in every dimension into one homogeneous puree. Bruce Kogut has
forcefully argued that many national institutional arrangements are far more
persistent historically and less transferable than technological understanding
itself. An example is what he refers to as "national organizing principles of
work;' a category encompassing such features as job tenure, hierarchy, job
specifications, and skill acquisition (Kogut 1990, 1992). Features ofthe Amer-
ican "national innovation system" continue to be distinctive, linked to such
enduring national traits and institutions as the antitrust tradition, high labor
mobility and weak job attachments, a strong venture-capital sector, and in-
dependent universities and professions (Nelson 1993). If such differences are
persistent, then we should expect to observe continuing national differences in
the types oftechnologies that are developed and selected for implementation.
But these observations do not gainsay the conclusion that technological net-
works no longer display the tight linkage between learning and national condi-
tions that prevailed a century ago.
14. These figures are drawn from Cantwell (1989, 23); Pavitt (1988, 142-43); Thomson and
Nelson (1996, table 1); National Science Board (1996, appendix table 6-7). The generalizations
in the last sentence come from Thomson and Nelson.321 Can a Nation Learn? American Technology as a Network Phenomenon
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Comment Alexander J. Field
Research in economic history and administrative service in a university moti-
vate both practical and scholarly interest in organizational persistence and dy-
namics. This conference has reinforced my beliefin the value ofan evolution-
ary perspective for understanding these phenomena. Such a perspective draws
an analogy between the influence of environmental forces on the survival of
organisms in biological populations, and corresponding processes affecting the
persistence of organizations. There is one key difference, however, between
natural selection as it occurs in the world of plants and animals and its func-
tioning among organizations. This difference concerns the role of mutations,
which in the biological context are largely random while in the organizational
context are the results ofspecific human intervention.
In a rapidly changing environment, a new strategic departure may enable a
firm to persist or grow. But ifthe nature ofthe environmental change is misper-
ceived, or misforecast, or ifthe costs and benefits ofthe mutation are improp-
erly estimated, such initiatives can create problems and in the worst case prove
disastrous for the firm or organization because they will draw financial re-
sources and administrative attention away from its core activities: those activi-
ties that exploit the differential capabilities thathave given the firm its competi-
tive advantage.
There has been so much written about the challenges ofovercoming inertia
that some leaders might be forgiven for thinking that their job was simply to
maximize the rate of organizational mutation. This conclusion, of course,
makes no more sense than a public-policy recommendation that we should
increase the irradiation of the human population on the grounds that some of
the resultant genetic changes might be evolutionarily adaptive. The challenge
oforganizational leadership is to establish a framework in which the ability of
an organization to survive and prosper (its evolutionary fitness) and its ability
to adapt to changing environmental influences (the two go hand in hand in a
dynamic context) can be sustained. David Hounshell's discussion (chap. 5) of
a key meeting at the Ford Motor Company in 1949 is a detailed dissection of
such a critical meeting. Major strategic departures can save an organization,
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and we can only marvel at the adroitness with which Microsoft, in a very short
time period, reoriented its strategy around the Internet. But bold departures
can also come close to destroying an organization, ifthey do not prove evolu-
tionarily adaptive. A case in point is Sears's entry into the real-estate and stock-
brokerage businesses in the early 1980s, discussed in the paper by Daniel Raff
and Peter Temin (chap. 6). In retrospect (it is of course easy to be a Monday-
morning quarterback), Sears might have been better advised to stick to its re-
tailing knitting, aggressively taking advantage of the new inventory-control,
logistical, and point-of-sale opportunities created by advances in information
technology, a policy it now appears to be following.
The Sears experience is a reminder that formal planning processes alone
will not guarantee evolutionarily favorable outcomes. Indeed, in the 1980s,
extensive multiparticipant strategic planning exercises appear, ex post, to have
resulted in worse decisions than was true of the largely autocratic process of
the 1920s, in which General (Robert) Wood, with the approval of only one
other individual (the CEO) brilliantly set up retail establishments away from
the center city in a manner that built on the organization's success as a mail-
order firm and effectively (for a time) met the challenge of the automobile.
What counts ultimately is the respective logic and analyses that underlie
these decisions.
The evolutionary perspective is useful in helping us understand why organi-
zations persist, and how we can influence the probability that they do. But in
this context, it is also worth stepping back and reflecting on why we care.
There are usually strong individual incentives for managers to maintain the
viability of firms, and bankruptcy and firm shutdown incur clear personal
costs. But why, from a social perspective, does it matter? After all, physical
capital and personnel don't disappearjustbecause an organization ceases func-
tioning. Evolutionary theory helps us understand why we do and should care.
First, when a successful organization emerges, it does so by stitching together
resources and people in a manner that gives the entity collective capabilities
that exceed the sum of the capabilities of the individuals, even if each of the
firm's members were given a per capita share ofthe resources. These superior
collective capabilities are what give the successful firm its evolutionary advan-
tage. Some of this advantage results from indivisibilities in physical capital,
giving rise to economies of scale, but much also comes from investment in
both processes and knowledge. Some ofthese investments have limited value
outside the organization.
Another way of thinking about investments in firm-specific capital is that
they are the embodiment of the firm's particular history and culture. This
knowledge, although valuable internally, is largely worthless outside of the
firm. Enabling a firm to persist and prosper means that organization-specific
resources-knowledge, processes, personnel-can continue to be effectively
utilized. There is inevitably value lost-often substantial-when an entity is328 Gavin Wright
dismantled and its component parts (those with value outside the dismantling
firm) redeployed. In extreme cases this is a necessary, even salutary, develop-
ment. More often, it is a symptom ofmanagerial failure.
The acquisition of organizational knowledge and capability is important
even in a technologically stable environment. In Kazuhiro Mishina's paper
(chap. 4 in this volume), for example, a clear argument is made that, in the
case of the dramatic reductions in the costs of producing the Boeing B-17
bomber, the most critical learning took place among networks ofmanagers as
they discovered how to organize production, both physically and temporally,
in the context ofa dramatic and mandated increase in the speed ofthroughput.
From the strict standpoint of aeronautical, mechanical, and electrical engi-
neering, the technology underlying the production of the bomber had not al-
tered, although the cost ofmanufacturing one fell dramatically.
Engineering breakthroughs that enable firms to move rapidly out along sup-
ply curves are sources ofcost reduction more familiar to economic historians.
Gavin Wright's innovation lies in insisting that we expand the scope for discus-
sion ofsuch learning from the individual firm to the nation. Focusing particu-
larly on cotton textiles, mining, and chemical engineering, Wright identifies a
number ofnational characteristics: antitrust, high labor mobility and weakjob
attachment, a strong venture-capital sector, and independent universities and
professions that underlay and, perhaps to an attenuated degree, still underlie
American technological networks. These networks, consistent with the com-
plementary existence oflarge and small technology-based companies, provide
the institutional underpinnings for talking about national technological styles,
and perhaps national competitive advantages. Wright titles his paper "Can a
Nation Learn?" but it is also about whether it is meaningful to talk about na-
tions as economic actors, with distinctive technological personalities and capa-
bilities that are more than the sum of the individual capabilities of firms and
organizations.
On the general conceptual question, ofcourseWright is right: at the national
level there is knowledge and learning that permits citizens collectively to ac-
complish more than if they were not stitched together by this specific human
capital. An obvious example in many countries consists oflanguage. An enor-
mous amount ofeffort takes place in our educational systems to teach students
spelling, the meaning of words, the rules of grammar, with the objective of
turning out individuals who are effective oral and written communicators. That
knowledge is of course valuable and enabling to the degree that others share
it. It may not be valuable outside of the country or linguistic region, just as
firm-specific knowledge may have little value outside ofone organization.
In fact Wright elevates language to a more general metaphor describing
learning at the national level in chemical engineering, geology, and the sci-
ences ofmining and mineral extraction. Through an infrastructure of govern-
mental and educational institutions, the Geological Survey office and schools
of mines at Berkeley, Colorado, and Columbia, for example, a language for329 Can a Nation Learn? American Technology as a Network Phenomenon
thinking about mineral exploitation spread across the country in a way that
enabled America, far more effectively than other regions similarly endowed
with resources, to achieve world leadership. Americans insisted on their own
names for geological strata, to the consternation of European scientists, but
there is more to this than simple chauvinism. It had the effect ofdifferentiating
and protecting a particular. style or network of national communication and
learning, a network that gave the country differential capabilities. Here are
examples in which it is meaningful to speak ofcollective capabilities that ex-
tended beyond the individual firm although not necessarily beyond the regional
or national boundary.
Wright suggests toward the end ofhis paper that the importance ofnations
as loci for technological learning has diminished with the increasing domi-
nance of science-based technologies, and that such learning at the end of the
twentieth century is far more likely to take place on a transnational scale. Cer-
tainly the data cited on trends in the share ofU.S. patents ofdomestic origin
supports this view. But what ofmore localized, regionally based learning net-
works?
It may be useful to considerAlfred Marshall's description ofexternal econo-
mies, surely motivated by the economic experience of places such as the
Manchester-Liverpool conurbation or the networks ofmetalworking expertise
in the Birmingham area. Small and medium-sized firms clustered together be-
cause they benefited from the easy interchange of ideas and personnel. Mar-
shall (1920, 237) believed that the relative importance of external economies
was increasing.
For External economies are constantly growing in importance relatively to
Internal in all matters ofTrade-knowledge: newspapers, and trade and tech-
nical publications ofall kinds are perpetually scouting for him and bringing
him much ofthe knowledge he wants-knowledge which a little while ago
would have been beyond the reach of anyone who could not afford to have
well-paid agents in many distant places. Again, it is to his interest also that
the secrecy ofbusiness is on the whole diminishing, and that the most im-
portant improvements in method seldom remain secret for long after they
have passed from the experimental stage. It is to his [the small manufactur-
er's] advantage that changes in manufacture depend less on mere rules of
thumb and more on broad developments of scientific principle: and that
many ofthese are made by students in the pursuit ofknowledge for its own
sake, and are promptly published in the general interest.
Note that Marshall attributes the growing importance ofexternal economies
to the increased dominance of science-based over experiential learning. For
Wright, the impact of that trend is less clear, in the late nineteenth century
appearing to foster national technological networks, but in the twentieth to
coincide with the migration oftechnological change into the orbits ofeitherin-
house R&D labs or more globalleaming networks. Although the Marshallian
mechanisms described are similar to those in Wright's paper, Marshall's330 Gavin Wright
insights seem to have been motivated by more regionally localized learning
than is the case for Wright. Partly this is because the former's ideas represented
to a greater degree a distillation ofthe history ofthe more geographically com-
pact British experience, whereas the latter's insights are more directly condi-
tioned by studies ofu.s. economic history.
Whether or not "national" learning has been largely supplanted by global
networks, the kind ofhighly localized phenomena that gave rise to Marshall's
insights about external economies are alive and well in the late twentieth cen-
tury in the United States, as is clear to anyone living amid the booming Silicon
Valley economy (this is written in spring of 1997). In spite of the great diffi-
culty and high cost offinding commercial real estate, apartments, storage lock-
ers' personnel, and so forth, many companies still desperately want to be close
to the action. Marshall's description of external economies was put forth in
some sense precisely to account for what Wright describes: an economy or
sector marked by the complementary coexistence oflarge and small firms as-
sociatedwith an industry structure characterized by lackofdominance by large
firms, high labor mobility, and weakjob attachments. It would be hard to find
a better description of the current organization of Silicon Valley software,
semiconductor, mass storage, and networking hardware sectors.
Wright, however, describes networks of learning with greater geographic
reach. His focus is explicitly on the emerging industries ofthe late nineteenth
century, with their greater reliance on science and research conducted by pro-
fessionally trained personnel. Thus Wright's emphasis on the role ofindepen-
dent universities and professions. In this context, the much greater geographic
dispersion ofAmerican universities and in particular their lack of concentra-
tion in the national capital may help in understanding differences in national
styles of learning, comparing the United States say with British or European
counterparts. Most of the comparative references in the current version ofthe
paper apply to Britain: more comparative study of the French and German
cases might be useful.
How much ofwhatWright describes for the late nineteenth century is histor-
ically specific, reflecting, perhaps, the golden age ofthe consulting engineer?
To what degree did the increased importance oforganized, firm-funded R&D
laboratories lead (contrary to Marshall) to a greater emphasis on secrecy, ap-
propriability ofinvestments in R&D, and a restriction on the freer flow ofin-
formation through professional networks described here? Steven Usselman's
paper (chap. 2 in this volume) describes, for example, the way the railroad
industry attempted to canalize research effort in areas anticipated to be com-
plementary to the national network being operated,.,and shut down or discour-
aged inquiry in areas viewed as likely to be unproductive or even to threaten
the established technological paradigm.
Has the integration of research into more formalized R&D labs during the
twentieth century meant that the more democratic style ofresearch described
by Wright is shut down? Is this trend counterbalanced by the emergence of331 Can a Nation Learn? American Technology as a Network Phenomenon
"global academies" of scientific and professional communItIes interacting
through international conferences, email, and scientific publication? R&D
spending today is heavily concentrated in a small number ofsectors: aeronau-
tics, chemicals, instrumentation, electrical machinery, and so forth. Has this
pattern remained relatively stable over time? Is it the case that, while the im-
portance of professional networks has declined in some sectors, it has in-
creased in others? Do more industries come to resemble what Usselman de-
scribes for railroads at the tum of the century? Or is there no real trend?
Questions such as these are crucial for further research.
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